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NO PAIN, NO GAIN: THE CRIMINAL
ABSENCE OF THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL
MARKETS THEORY FROM INSIDER
TRADING SENTENCING
NICHOLAS P. PELLICANI†
INTRODUCTION
Michael Douglas’s notorious Wall Street character Gordon
Gekko once proclaimed, “I don’t throw darts at a board. I bet on
sure things. . . . Every battle is won before it is ever fought.”1
Mr. Gekko famously epitomized the greed of 1980s traders
through his ability to trade stocks based on information he had
exclusive access to, thereby allowing himself to place bets on
events that were certain to occur.2 While traders of publicly
traded securities are presumed to base their decisions on timely
and accurate information,3 when that information is unknown to
the public, the resulting gains or avoided losses are not
legitimate.4 Knowledge of such information provides traders like
Gekko with an unfair advantage in the fierce battle over profits.
Known as insider trading, this conduct is contrary to the
“justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors . . . have relatively equal access to material
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Editor-in-Chief, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.S., 2004, Boston College. For her insightful guidance, I
acknowledge and thank Professor Lisa Catalano. I am most especially grateful to my
wife, Fabiana, my aspiration and inspiration, without whose love, support, and
carinho this Note would not be possible.
1
WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1987).
2
See Tim Arango, Greed Is Bad, Gekko. So Is a Meltdown., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2009, at C1.
3
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1993).
4
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (2010).
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information.”5 Arguably, the incentives and opportunities today
to illegally profit from inside information have never been
greater. Take the hedge fund industry and one of its giants, the
Galleon Group, which had over $7 billion in assets.6 Galleon’s
CEO, Raj Rajaratnam, who Forbes Magazine labeled as a “Money
Maverick” despite the difficult economy, attributed his success to
“frequent visits with companies” and “conversations with execs
who invest in his fund.”7 Almost simultaneous with these
accolades came Rajaratnam’s arrest in connection with one of the
“biggest criminal case[s] involving hedge fund insider trading.”8
Allegedly, Rajaratnam, along with a network of others, including
directors at high profile companies such as Intel and McKinsey,
netted millions in illicit profits by passing inside information
gleaned from their jobs to trade on publicly traded companies
such as Google.9
The prevalence of insider trading at all levels of society is
also alarming, as evidenced in a recent SEC investigation for
possible criminal violations of securities laws. Following up on a
tip of “suspicious activity,” improprieties, and “trading on nonpublic information” it was revealed that the group at issue had
“no compliance system in place to ensure that its employees did
not engage in insider trading.”10 The allegations centered not on
a vast network of executives and directors but on longtime
employees who were lawyers.11 Their employer—the SEC!12
To combat this epidemic, regulatory authorities have
increased enforcement efforts through a variety of measures,

5

SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
Matthew Miller & Duncan Greenberg, Money Mavericks, FORBES, Oct. 19,
2009, at 114.
7
Id.
8
Walter Hamilton & Martin Zimmerman, COURTS; Hedge Fund Scheme
Alleged; Authorities Arrest Six Suspected of Extensive Insider Trading After a
Wiretap Investigation., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at B1.
9
See id.
10
See Bernie Becker, Insider Trading Inquiry Cites Lawyers at S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2009, at B3.
11
Id.
12
Id.; see also Brody Mullins, Tom McGinty & Jason Zweig, Congressional
Staffers Gain From Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2010, at A1
(highlighting the prevalence and legality of congressional aids trading on the basis of
inside information about pending legislation, such as tax incentives for renewable
energy sources).
6
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making insider trading a top priority.13 In the Rajaratnam case,
wiretapping was used for perhaps the first time to detect the
passing of inside information, which “reflects that the
government thinks this is serious conduct involving a significant
amount of money.”14 But with its limited resources, the SEC is
forced to take creative measures to counteract criticisms of being
soft on white-collar criminals and Wall Street.15 The SEC’s
aggressive approach and unfettered power, though, produces far
more dangerous consequences when it comes to criminal
prosecutions in which incarceration is at stake, unlike the mere
threat of monetary damages and a loss of reputation in civil
suits.
Criminally, insider trading—that is, trading public securities
on the basis of inside, undisclosed information—is punished
according to the gains received by the insider as a result of the
trading.16 In other words, the greater the gains, the longer the
sentence. The potential punishment is high, as the already
harsh penalties under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 198817 were increased in 2002 to possible
fines of up to $5 million for individuals and prison sentences of
up to twenty years.18 Given its only mixed success in prosecuting
criminal insider trading cases,19 the government has every

13
In 2008, the SEC brought the second-highest number of insider trading cases
in its history, up more than twenty-five percent from 2007. U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, 2008 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 12, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2008.pdf. More recently, the most extensive
insider trading investigation ever conducted by the SEC has been brought to light,
covering three years and focusing on the network of information sharing among
consultants, bankers, traders, and fund managers. See Susan Pulliam et al., U.S. in
Vast Insider Trading Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2010, at A1.
14
Hamilton & Zimmerman, supra note 8 (quoting the former head of the
securities fraud unit in the Manhattan U.S. Attorney’s office).
15
See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES ENFORCEMENT
191 (1981) (noting the criticism of white-collar criminals receiving lesser sentences
than convicts of common crimes).
16
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 (2010).
17
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered
subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2006)).
18
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
19
See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS
ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 9.4 (2d ed. 2010). The SEC lacks
criminal jurisdiction over securities violations, so they are brought by the U.S.
Attorney’s Office, although the SEC may transmit evidence to the Department of
Justice for prosecution. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b).
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incentive to make examples out of those insiders that it is
actually able to convict by seeking longer sentences.
In pursuing longer sentences, however, the SEC has turned
its back on the rationale and assumptions underlying the basis of
many securities fraud regulations it previously embraced, a fact
not gone unnoticed by courts.20 Overall, the SEC and courts have
generally indicated a desire to enforce securities laws based on
the premise that in the case of widely traded issuers, the market
prices of shares are a reflection of all the public information
regarding those companies.21 Insider trading cases settled on
plea bargains reflect this economic-reality.22
In insider trading sentencing though, the SEC has argued to
the contrary. Specifically, the SEC has defined “gains” to include
price changes based on information that the trader did not
exclusively know about and thus could not have traded illegally
on.23 If other information of the same nature facilitates the
stock’s price in that direction, then if even though the trader is
no longer acting on “inside” information, his punishment will
continue to increase. This is inconsistent, however, with what
makes traders like Gordon Gekko universally despised: the
benefits derived from trading on undisclosed information. By
measuring a trader’s gains without reference to the date when
the information at issue becomes public, sentences ignore the
universally accepted relationship between prices and
information: In an efficient market, the value of a given piece of
information is immediately apparent upon its disclosure.24

20
See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 n.11 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The
Government does not further the goals of sentencing uniformity or fairness
when . . . the Government persistently adopts aggressive, inconsistent . . . theories of
loss.”).
21
See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice,
Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 527, 536 (1990).
22
See, e.g., Exhibit A to Plea Agreement at 1–2, United States v. Rieker, 284 F.
Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (No. 01-3913), available at http://news.findlaw.com/
legalnews/lit/enron/.
23
See Brief of Appellee at 18, United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093 (D. Minn.
2003) (No. 02-3388) (“[I]t is not unreasonable to view all of appellant’s profits as ‘ill
gotten.’ Absent an opportunity to trade inside information, there is no evidence in
the record that appellant would ever have purchased the stock.” (quoting SEC v.
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 1983)).
24
See infra Part II.C (outlining the basic principles of the Efficient Capital
Markets Theory).
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The Rajaratnam case illustrates the crucial role of the
sentencing component in insider trading cases. Given the
government25 and SEC26 have such strong evidence, convictions
of most, if not all, involved is likely.27 For those not pleading
guilty, because of the case’s high profile, the real issue at stake
will be the theory of calculating the traders’ illegal gains
advanced by the government, as it is alleged that the profits of
those charged to date total close to $52 million.28 If the SEC’s
civil complaint in connection with several of the alleged traders is
any indication,29 the calculation with the greatest effect will
likely be pursued. The complaint treats “illicit profits” as the
difference between the purchase price and the later sales price,
with only a passing reference to the duration between the
corrective disclosure and date of sale.30 If this approach is
accepted for all defendants, excessively long sentences may
result.
This Note argues that, for purposes of criminal insider
trading sentencing, courts should look to the date that the

25
United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-CR-1184, 2010 WL 3219340, at *2–4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010).
26
Amended Complaint at 15–44, SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., LP, 683 F. Supp. 2d
316 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 8811).
27
See David Glovin, Bob Van Voris & Joshua Gallu, Hedge Fund Managers,
Traders Charged in Galleon Trading Probe, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a120BAm_KwvQ&pos=2
(noting that fourteen had already been charged, and five had pled guilty, to criminal
insider trading); Susan Pulliam, Insider-Trading Case: Five Cooperating Witnesses
Propel Federal Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2009, at A11 (identifying five witnesses
cooperating with prosecutors in the case against Rajaratnam). The first conviction
reached in connection with the case resulted in a twenty-seven month prision
sentence to a former partner at the hedge fund New Castle LLC based on his
$900,000 in illicit proceeds. See Chad Bray, Galleon Figure Gets a 27-Month Prison
Term, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2010, at B3. However, Raj Rajaratnam has pled not
guilty, likely going to trial in early 2011. Pulliam et al., supra note 13.
28
Glovin, Voris & Gallu, supra note 27.
29
See Complaint at 4–7, SEC v. Cutillo, No. 09 Civ. 9208 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2009).
30
Id. The complaint alleges that information regarding acquisitions or sales was
first obtained by a lawyer representing one of the companies and then dispersed to
up to five traders. Id. at 1, 3–4. For each transaction, the complaint specified the
date on which the information was passed on to each individual in the chain, the
date each party purchased their respective securities, and the date on which that
transaction was publicly announced. Id. at 3–6. Regarding the corrective disclosure
and subsequent sale of their holding, though, it merely states that “[t]hey sold
their . . . holdings
shortly
after
the
public
announcement
of
the
proposed . . . acquisition.” Id. at 4–6.
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information was disclosed to determine the amount of the
defendant’s gains. This point in time simultaneously signifies
the conclusion of the offense and the market’s valuation of the
information initially traded on. Part I will discuss the statutory
prohibition on insider trading and its corresponding sentencing
formula. Part II will focus on the current approaches adopted for
measuring gains of insider trading in criminal sentencing, as
well as other forms of securities fraud violations. Part III will
identify the presence of the Efficient Capital Markets Theory in
the general framework of insider trading and disclosure
regulations.
Finally, Part III will advance a solution to
calculating gains by presuming that in an efficient market, a
stock’s price reflects the previously undisclosed information upon
its disclosure and therefore, concludes the accumulation of gains
for sentencing purposes.
I.
A.

INSIDER TRADING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCES

Insider Trading

Trading of public securities based on inside, or undisclosed,
material information, is prohibited by section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which states that it is unlawful
to “use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations.”31 Though not
specifically proscribed, insider trading is punished under the
general anti-fraud provision of Rule 10b-5.32 Rule 10b-5 provides
for criminal penalties against anyone who willfully violates the
provisions33 and was adopted to close a perceived loophole in the
anti-fraud provisions of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
31
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Insider trading cases may also allege violations of
regulations prohibiting trading on or tipping material, nonpublic information
concerning tender offers, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (2010), or mail and wire fraud,
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2011).
32
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly . . . [t]o employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, . . . or [t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Id.
33
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). Rule 10b-5 also allows private causes of action. Id. § 78t1(a).
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1933,34 which applied only to the “offer or sale” of securities and
not to their purchase.35 Specifically, the rule was developed in
response to a report regarding a corporate president who
purchased shares after misrepresenting to the public that the
corporation was doing poorly and shortly before the corporation
announced that its profits had quadrupled.36 In the wake of this
case, when Rule 10b-5 was presented to the Commission, the
only needed persuasion was: “Well, . . . we are against fraud,
aren’t we?”37
The initial requirement for the offense of insider trading is a
defendant’s classification as an “insider,” which is based on a
duty owed not to trade on the confidential information. A
trader’s duty under Rule 10b-5 must be premised on one of two
theories: classical or misappropriation. Classical insider trading
involves a corporate officer trading his own corporation’s
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information.38 The
classic insider owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders of the
company not to trade on nonpublic information and thus does not
extend to those without a connection to shareholders.39 This duty
also applies to those who relay information, or “tippers,” to
another who then trades on it, with the added stipulation that
“absent some personal gain [to the tipper], there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders.”40
A duty based on the
misappropriation theory applies to any person who takes
“confidential information for securities trading purposes, in
breach of a duty owed to the source of the information,” not
necessarily the corporation whose securities are traded.41 Section
10(b), however, does not apply to all breaches of a fiduciary duty

34
John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1366 (1981).
35
15 U.S.C. § 77q; Barry III, supra note 34 (quoting § 77q).
36
Barry III, supra note 34.
37
Milton V. Freeman, Speech at the Conference on Codification of the Fed. Sec.
Laws (Nov. 18–19, 1966), in 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (observation by Milton
Freeman, one of Rule 10b-5’s drafters, of Sumner Pike, Commission of the SEC,
which was the lone comment by the SEC on the draft).
38
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–30 (1980).
39
See id. at 224, 231–33 (holding that a printer who had deduced inside
information from documents handled at work without disclosing his knowledge did
not violate section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because the use of the nonpublic information
was not fraud since he had no duty to disclose it before trading).
40
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1983).
41
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
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but only to those that involve “manipulative or deceptive”
conduct.42 As both forms of liability are based on a “relationship
of trust and confidence,” insiders are essentially given a choice:
“abstain or disclose.”43 The rationale for liability premised on a
duty is: (1) the relationship gives that person access to
information available “only for a corporate purpose”; and
(2) based on “the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing.”44
In addition to insider and duty requirements, the statutory
language requires that the fraud be “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any securit[ies]”45 or when “capitalizing on
such information through securities transactions.”46 A decision to
“hold” stock based on nonpublic information is not proscribed.47
Additionally, the purchase or sale must be made “on the basis of
material, non-public information,” that is, the trader must be
aware of the information when the transaction was made.48 This
does not necessarily require that the “use” of the information be
proven but merely that the trader knowingly possessed the
information at the time of the trade.49 Finally, the information
traded on must be material. “Material information,” for purposes
of Rule 10b-5, includes any fact that “in reasonable and objective
contemplation might affect the value of the corporation’s”50
securities, although trading by insiders can supply “strong
circumstantial evidence” of the materiality.51 As Rule 10b-5 is
42
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471
(1977) (quoting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
43
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230, 246.
44
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
46
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656.
47
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754–55 (1975);
Condus v. Howard Sav. Bank, 781 F. Supp. 1052, 1056 (D.N.J. 1992).
48
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Defenses to Rule 10b5 include trading based on a prior written agreement
to buy or sell the security or if as part of a plan. See id. § 240.105b-1(c)(1)(i)(A).
49
See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1993); Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 73 SEC Docket 3
(Aug. 15, 2000).
50
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51
Id. at 852 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284
(1966), aff’d in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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based on the justifiable expectation that all “all investors should
have equal access” to material information,52 criminal liability
attaches only when the information is nonpublic at the time of
purchase or sale.53
Due to their shared required elements, criminal and civil
insider trading cases can typically be brought on the same set of
facts.54 Criminal cases are often followed by civil actions, as
double jeopardy in these circumstances does not apply.55 As
such, criminal convictions are pursued only when the evidence is
sufficiently strong56 for higher profile or extreme conduct cases.57
B.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Insider Trading

Federal sentencing determinations for fraud-based securities
violations, including insider trading, are governed by the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).58 Although their use is no
longer mandatory,59 the Guidelines remain heavily relied on by
judges, with sentences rarely departing too drastically from
them.60 Judges are now implored to apply a reasonability
standard, in that a sentence should be “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary,” to accomplish the goals of sentencing.61
52

Id. at 851.
United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
information is public when it is known by the relevant financial community).
54
See BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 19. One difference is that a criminal
defendant must have acted “knowingly,” as opposed to “recklessly.”
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006). This heightened mental state merely requires a
“realization on the defendant’s part that he was doing a wrongful act . . . and that
the knowingly wrongful act involved a significant risk of effecting the violation that
occurred.” United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1370 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445
U.S. 222 (1980) (emphasis added). Criminal actions are not limited by “buyer-seller”
allegations, as the government merely needs to prove that the defendant engaged in
a “manipulative or deceptive” practice. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); see United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981).
55
See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997).
56
See United States v. Cassese, 428 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2005).
57
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 19 (“Criminal prosecution is generally
reserved for aggravated cases, chosen in prosecutorial discretion, based on factors
like severity of violation, number of victims, size of losses, and problems of proof.”).
58
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2010).
59
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
60
See Press Release, Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: The Impact of United
States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/documents/United_States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf (indicating that
the number of sentences falling within the Guidelines fell a mere 2.8% between 2002
and 2006).
61
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2011).
53
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Pursuant to the Guidelines, criminal sentence generally are
based on a combination of: (1) a base level sentence; (2) an
increase based on the extent of losses or gains caused as a result
of the offense; and (3) other offense and offender characteristics,
which may increase or decrease the total sentence.62 The
calculated base level offense is then translated into the
appropriate Federal Sentencing Table to produce a range of
months of incarceration based on the defendant’s criminal
history.63 For insider trading, the base level sentence is eight.64
But the amount of computed gains has the potential to
significantly add to that figure.65
The central issue at the sentencing phase for insider trading
is determining the “gain resulting from the offense.”66 The level
of the total offense rises based on the amount of calculated gains,
ranging from an increase of two for $5,000 of gains, to an
increase of thirty for more than $400 million of gains.67 “Gains”
for insider trading constitutes the value of the defendant’s gains
and not victim’s losses “[b]ecause the victims and their losses are
difficult if not impossible to identify.”68 The background to the
Guidelines defines a “gain” as “the total increase in value
realized through trading in securities by the defendant and
persons acting in concert with the defendant or to whom the
defendant [has] provide[d] inside information.”69 For all offenses,
relevant conduct for sentencing is based only on those “acts and
omissions committed . . . that occurred during the commission of
the offense.”70

62

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1.
Id. § 5A.
64
Id. § 2B1.4.
65
For example, assuming all other things equal and a first time criminal, the
base level from a gain of $5,000 results in a sentencing range of zero to six months,
while a gain of $400 million would lead to a sentencing range of 235 to 293 months.
See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(P); id. § 5A.
66
Id. § 2B1.4; see also United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1067 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
67
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4.
68
Id. § 2B1.4 cmt. background.
69
Id.
70
Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1).
63
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II. MEASURING GAINS AND LOSSES IN SECURITIES FRAUD
A.

The Current Split of How To Measure Criminal Insider
Trading Gains

The controversy over the appropriate calculation of insider
trading gains for criminal sentencing purposes revolves around
differing views as to when the offense ceases and in part, around
the extent to which it should borrow from calculations in other
securities fraud cases. Specifically, the distinction between the
two views is whether a trader’s “gain resulting from the offense”
consists of the total profits that a trader earned or the specific
economic benefit the trader derived from the nonpublic
information.
The Court of Appeals first addressed the issue in United
States v. Mooney.71 The facts of the case can be illustrated by this
hypothetical: Trader M worked as an underwriter for a major
health-care company, U-Care.72 In May, M was exposed to
confidential information concerning U-Care’s unannounced
acquisition of a target company.73 On June 1, M purchased
20,000 shares of U-Care for $10 per share.74 On July 1, the New
York Times first mentioned the advanced stage of negotiations
between U-Care and the target, leading to a sharp increase in
trading volume and an immediate increase in price to $12.75 On
July 15, U-Care publicly announced its agreement to acquire the
target.76 On August 1, M sold 10,000 shares of U-Care at $15 per
share.77 On November 1, M sold the remaining 10,000 shares for
$20 each.78
M was found guilty of various violations of mail and
securities fraud, including four counts of insider trading under
Rule 10b-5, and M was sentenced based on his gains, held to be
the total profit earned through selling all his shares or
$150,000.79 On appeal, M contended that the market would have
71

425 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
See id. at 1095.
73
See id. at 1096.
74
See id. at 1095–96.
75
See id. at 1096.
76
See id. at 1097.
77
See id.
78
See id.
79
See id. at 1095, 1099–100. For example, the total gains from the shares sold
on November 1, would be calculated by subtracting the purchase price ($10) from the
72
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reasonably absorbed the information concerning the acquisition a
week after the initial negotiation article and two days after the
confirmed agreement.80 M argued that the profits he received as
a result of the appreciation of U-Care between when the market
would have “absorbed” the information regarding the sale—
approximately August 1—and when he sold his shares in
November, or $5 per share, were irrelevant.81
A divided Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant’s “market
absorption” approach. Instead, it upheld the district court’s
sentencing by reading “gain resulting from the offense” pursuant
to the Guidelines Commentary that defined it as “the total
increase in value realized through trading in securities by the
defendant.”82 The court held the word “realized” to mean that a
defendant’s subsequent sales price must be used for the
calculation of gains, even if the sale occurs well after the
disclosure date, as was the case there.83 The court refused to
employ principles of “loss causation” from civil cases84 by
concluding it was “the inside trader who chooses the timing of his
transactions—his purchases as well as his sales.”85 The court
also found comfort in “a clear and coherent brightline [sic]” for
sentences by not engaging in “extensive factfinding [sic]” to
“determine when the market ha[d] absorbed nonpublic
information.”86
A far different approach was recommended by the dissent.
Judge Bright, writing for the dissent, felt that the “gain resulting
from the deception stops when the deception stops, though there
may be later gain (or loss) as the stock market gyrates along,
unmolested by any deception.”87 Judge Bright asserted that the
deception stops when the “market adjusts to this information,”

sales price ($20), multiplied by the number of shares (10,000), to reach the total
($100,000). Under the facts of the case, this resulted in a sentencing range of 37 to
46 months. See id. at 1098.
80
See id. at 1098–99.
81
See id. Under the facts of the case, this resulted in a sentencing range of 24 to
30 months. Id.
82
Id. at 1099–110 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt.
background (2010)).
83
Id. at 1100.
84
See infra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
85
Mooney, 425 F.3d at 1099 n.5.
86
Id. at 1101.
87
Id. at 1106 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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and thus later stock price fluctuations are legitimate.88 Since the
“ups and downs of the stock market are not causative of loss to
the deceived parties,”89 a sentence should not include “all the
defendant’s stock gains . . . but only the stock gains ‘resulting
from the offense.’ ”90 By basing the “sentence on the throw of the
dice—the ups and downs of the stock market,”91 this approach
resulted in unequal sentences for equal crimes.92
The market absorption approach was later endorsed by the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Nacchio.93 The facts of the case
can be illustrated by this hypothetical: Trader N was CEO of QCom, a publicly traded communications company, and was
partially compensated through Q-Com stock options.94 N knew
that Q-Com was relying heavily on a type of nonrecurring
revenue source to meet its guidance numbers and would likely
miss its annual projections, information that was not publicly
known.95 In March, N exercised one million options, each with an
exercise price of $5, for a cost of $5 million and then sold the
shares at $10 per share for total proceeds of $10 million, less
taxes and commissions of $2 million.96 Over the following
months, the price of Q-Com dropped to $3.97 Despite prior
disclosures that referenced the issue, Q-Com did not disclose the
magnitude of their revenue shortfall until August, and in
September, it issued a press release lowering its revenue targets,
at which point the stock fell to $2.98

88

Id.
Id. at 1108.
90
Id. at 1105 n.9.
91
Id. at 1108 n.12.
92
See id. at 1108. To illustrate his point, Judge Bright presented the “Larry,
Moe, and Curly” hypothetical, where three traders purchase the same shares, based
on the same information, at the same time, but sell at various points after disclosure
of the information—one immediately when the market absorbed the positive
information, one three months later, and one six months later. Id. at 1107. But each
sold at different prices due to subsequent market fluctuations, and three different
sentences resulted. See id.
93
573 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
94
Id. at 1065.
95
Id. at 1064.
96
See id. at 1065.
97
See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10, United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062
(10th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-1311) (contending that the entire telecommunications sector
declined during that period due to projected “adverse economic and demand trends”).
98
See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1066.
89
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At trial, employing the “net profit” approach from Mooney,
the government argued that N’s gain was the total amount
received from stock sales, less the exercise price, or $9 million.99
N argued that the maximum portion of his gains attributable to
inside information was only $1 million or the effect the
information, measured by the August and September disclosures,
had on the price of the stock.100 The district court found N guilty
on nineteen counts of insider trading and sentenced him based on
a gain calculation of $7 million or the total proceeds less costs.101
On appeal, the district court’s calculation was rejected as
inconsistent with the offense of insider trading.102 According to
the Tenth Circuit, N’s offense was not the “sale of the shares
itself, but in the deception intertwined with the sales due to his
possession of insider knowledge.”103
Therefore, “any gain
associated with lawful trading,” or trading purely on the basis of
publicly available information, should not be incorporated into a
prison sentence.104 As such, “gain[s] attributable to legitimate
price appreciation and the underlying inherent value of
the . . . shares” were not to be included in sentencing.105 Since N
sold the shares based on his inside knowledge of negative
information concerning the company, he sold at a higher price
than he would have had it been disclosed.106 It was this
“artificially high value,” and not the stock’s total value, that was
illicit and “should be reflected in the gain calculation.”107
On remand, the district court was advised to apply a civil
disgorgement theory to establish a “cutoff point for assessing the
gain of the illegal conduct” as “the point when the information is
disclosed and absorbed by the market.”108 Since the price of QCom decreased prior to the disclosure relating to the revenue
99
See id. at 1068. Under the facts of the case, this approach resulted in a
sentencing range of 70 to 87 months. Id.
100
See id. Under the facts of the case, this resulted in a sentencing range of 41 to
51 months. Id.
101
See id. at 1066, 1068–69. Under the facts of the case, this approach resulted
in a sentencing range of 63 to 78 months, with an actual sentence imposed of 72
months. Id. at 1069.
102
See id. at 1071–72.
103
Id. at 1072.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1075.
106
See id. at 1076.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1082.
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shortfall, this approach “would better capture the increase in
value received by the defendant due to unlawful trading in
securities.”109 To accurately measure only “ill-gotten gains,”110
“factors unrelated to the defendant’s criminally culpable
conduct,”111 such as “unrelated negative industry developments
and their impact on the stock price,” were to be excluded.112 The
court acknowledged that while it may not be entirely possible to
exclude chance market forces from an insider’s illegal gains, this
approach narrows “the range of possible extraneous economic
factors that might influence the gain amount” and therefore, “the
range of possible sentencing disparities.”113
B.

Causation and Calculations in Other Settings

The views over gain calculations in criminal insider trading
sentencing are relatively contrasting, but calculating the impact
of other forms of securities fraud exhibits a more unified
approach. Whether calculating other securities fraud crimes or
civil insider trading, a pervasive goal of causation emerges that
reflects an appreciation of how markets operate.
Awards in the civil context under Rule 10b-5 are supported
by a combination of theories of restitution, loss of expectancy,
and damages.114 Damages, or the economic losses attributable to
a misstatement or omission, are typically based on the “out-ofpocket” impact to defendants or the “difference between the
purchase price and the value of the stock at the date of
purchase.”115 Courts consider this figure to best measure the
damages “proximately caused by the defendants’ deceit”116

109

Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1084 n.20.
111
Id. at 1080–81.
112
Id. at 1085.
113
Id. at 1086 n.23.
114
See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 353–54 (1984).
115
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the primary methodologies for calculating out-of-pocket losses,
see infra notes 202–08 and accompanying text.
116
Huddleston v. Herman & MacClean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981),
overruled on other grounds by Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir.
2009).
110
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because it is based on the reasoning that the higher share price
paid by victims due to the fraudulent misstatement constitutes
their losses.117
In evaluating the true stock price, in the case of publicly
traded markets, other information aside from that at issue may
affect a stock’s price. The connection between price changes and
fraudulent conduct is embodied in the requirement of loss
causation.118 Plaintiffs must establish that the fraud caused the
demonstrable loss because, given the “tangle of factors affecting
price,” an inflated stock price is not presumptively caused by the
fraud, even if the subsequent disclosure results in a lower market
price.119 This is because a “lower price may reflect, not the earlier
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances,
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or firmspecific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately
or together account for some or all of that lower price.”120 As a
result, a plaintiff must prove that the market, as reflected by the
share price, and not just the individual was deceived to recover
damages.121
In civil insider trading cases, disgorgement of profits is the
proper measure of awards.122 Disgorgement defines ill-gotten
profits as those gained during the time the fraud was in general
circulation among the investing public,123 though they “need only
be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to
the violation.”124 Damages are generally limited to “only those
accretions occurring up to a reasonable time after [the harmed
investor] discovered the truth.”125 The rationale is that, on
discovery of the truth, an investor “can protect against further

117

See Green, 541 F.2d at 1344.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 904 (1992).
119
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
120
Id.
121
See Langevoort, supra note 118.
122
See SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 31 (1st Cir. 2004).
123
SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc); see also SEC v.
Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995).
124
SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
125
MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53.
118
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damage by replacing the securities and should not be allowed to
profit from a further appreciation, while being protected against
depreciation by his right to recover.”126
In criminal securities fraud cases not involving insider
trading, sentences are based on victims’ pecuniary losses.127
Despite various calculations available to measure this,128 all
strive to determine the extent to which a defendant’s fraud, as
distinguished from market or other forces, caused shareholders’
losses.129 As in civil cases, out-of-pocket damages are the
preferred method for measuring losses.130 To determine victims’
losses, first, the “remaining” value of the securities subjected to
the fraud is deducted from the purchase price.131 Second, no loss
can be attributed to the defendant “unless and until the truth is
subsequently revealed and the price of the stock accordingly
declines.”132 Third, “the government must prove that the fraud
inflated the price . . . and that the investors ‘lost’ ” as a result.133
If the price declined—at least in part—for reasons other than the
fraud, not all of the decline can be attributed to the defendant.134
Price movements prior and subsequent to the corrective
disclosure shed light on determining the requisite causation.135
126
Id. (quoting Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d
Cir. 1973)).
127
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii) (2010).
128
See Kevin P. McCormick, Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effects of
Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1145, 1164–71 (2008)
(outlining the differences between the simple rescissory, modified rescissory, market
capitalization, and out-of-pocket methods).
129
See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The District
Court’s basic failure at least to approximate the amount of the loss caused by the
fraud without even considering other factors relevant to a decline in . . . share price
requires a remand to redetermine the amount of the loss . . . .”); United States v.
Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 128 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Losses from causes other than the fraud
must be excluded from the loss calculation.”).
130
See United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871–72 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
Rescissory damages are more appropriate where the market value is too difficult to
ascertain. See id. at 873; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt.
n.3(C)(i).
131
See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2008).
132
United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005).
133
Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (holding that it is not reasonable to assume a
stock’s inflated price remains following a negative announcement).
134
Olis, 429 F.3d at 546.
135
See United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 720–22 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
where the government alleged the promotion of a “worthless” company, subsequent
significant increases in the stock price after the disclosure demonstrated the
contrary); Olis, 429 F.3d at 548 (holding that when most of a price drop occurred
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Thus, sentences in these criminal securities cases are a function
of the extent of the defendant’s culpability up until the stock
price accurately reflects the available information.
C.

The Efficient Capital Markets Theory

The court in Nacchio advocated the need to base criminal
sentencing of insider trading on a “thorough analys[is] grounded
in economic reality.”136 This Note contends that the Efficient
Capital Markets Theory (“ECMT”) is such an analysis, as it
provides an explanation of the relationship between the price of a
publicly traded security and the market. In essence, the ECMT
states that “in an efficient market prices ‘fully reflect’ available
information” regarding a company.137 This proposition was
originally developed to discount claims that profits in the market
could be achieved by reacting the quickest to information, since
all information publicly available is impounded in a stock’s
price.138 For example, if an investor read a pharmaceutical
company’s press release immediately upon release that notes
FDA approval for the company’s drug that cures cancer and then
immediately called a broker to buy those shares to capitalize on
the news, it would have already been too late. The ECMT
therefore relies on the assumption that what is “actually
observed” in the market with respect to the price and time of
securities is synonymous with the “result if everyone knew the
information.”139
To reach this conclusion, the ECMT focuses on the
fundamental relationship between the availability of information
and stock prices. “Corporate finance theory holds that the stock
price of a company reflects the market’s estimation of the
company’s future cash flows, discounted back to the present at

before the corrective disclosure, attributing the entire stock price decline to the
defendant overstated his personal criminal culpability).
136
See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1075 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
137
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384 (1970).
138
See EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE: PORTFOLIO DECISIONS AND
SECURITIES PRICES 136 (1976) (finding that a market is efficient with respect to a
given information set if, at a specific point in time, the information that the market
uses to determine security prices includes all the information available).
139
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 552, 558 (1984).
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the company’s cost of capital.”140 In other words, a stock’s
intrinsic value is the general consensus of the company’s future
success, with “present or past . . . performance [used] as an
indicator of . . . future cash flows.”141 To reach this consensus,
individual market participants form opinions on various pieces
information, both from a company specific and general market
condition basis, to determine an individual security’s valuation at
any given point in time. According to the ECMT, “on the
average, competition will cause the full effects of new information
on intrinsic values to be reflected ‘instantaneously’ in actual
prices.”142
The ECMT operates through one of three primary market
responses to information that represent the extent of a market’s
efficiency based on the costs and availability of the information
at issue: weak, strong, and semi-strong markets.143 Weak
markets are those in which the history of past prices does not
lead to predictable valuations, minimizing exploitable trading
opportunities.144 Strong markets are those in which individuals
“have monopolistic access to . . . information relevant [to]
price.”145 The most realistic is the semi-strong market,146 which
assumes that all available public information is fully reflected in
a security’s market price.147 This price, which represents the
stock’s intrinsic value, is a product of competing experts
attempting to interpret and process the same information for

140
Jay W. Eisenhofer, Geoffrey C. Jarvis & James R. Banko, Securities Fraud,
Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based
Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1421 (2004).
141
Id. at 1442 (emphasis omitted).
142
Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
55, 56 (1965), reprinted in RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 156, 158 (1980) (emphasis
omitted).
143
Fama, supra note 137, at 414.
144
See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A
Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 375–76 (1984); Fama, supra
note 137, at 383.
145
Fama, supra note 137, at 383.
146
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059,
1082–83 (1990) (noting that recent economic research accepts the assumptions of the
semi-strong form, citing studies measuring the effects of stock prices from stock
splits, “large block trades . . . by corporate insiders or market professionals,”
takeover attempts, and Federal Reserve policy changes).
147
Fama, supra note 137, at 383.
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their own gain through purchasing or selling shares.148 Both
“soft information,” such as “forecasts and estimates,” and “hard
information,” or “known facts,” are relevant in this respect.149
The achievement of an efficient market requires two market
mechanisms that are affected by insider trading: incorporating
information into prices and providing liquidity in trading.150
Incorporating information into a price requires producing
information, both firm specific and of the general market,
verifying the provided information, and processing and
“analyzing the information.”151 Liquidity in trading is realized
through sufficient competing participants all seeking to achieve a
predetermined risk level.152
Today’s competitive market,
dominated by analyst coverage and professional traders,
epitomize the “semi-strong” market by effecting a “rapid price
equilibration” because of the presence of “only a minority of
knowledgeable traders who control a critical volume of trading
activity.”153 By taking information accessible to only a few
traders and rapidly assimilating it into the price, these
participants transform a limited disclosure into one that can
safely be considered “public.”154 Efficient markets therefore
require important current information to be available to all
participants at low transaction costs and large numbers of
rational, profit maximizers actively competing to predict future
market values of individual securities.155
III. APPLYING THE MARKET EFFICIENCY THEORY TO MEASURE
INSIDER GAINS
This Note contends that the ECMT should be used for
calculating individual gains in the criminal sentencing of insider
trading. The utilization of the ECMT in other capacities reveals
the confidence the SEC and courts have placed in it to explain

148

See Dennis, supra note 144, at 379.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 561–62.
150
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 720 (2006).
151
Id. at 721.
152
See id. at 722.
153
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 569.
154
Id.
155
See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 337 (8th ed. 2006); Fama, supra note 137, at
388.
149
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and regulate markets. In the context of the precise harms
insider trading causes, cutting off liability immediately on a
corrective disclosure provides the most rational solution toward a
sentence consistent with criminal sentencing and economic
reality. The effect of this approach is that, in an efficient market,
an insider’s gain is to be measured from the next closing price of
the stock following disclosure of the previously confidential
information.
A.

Legal Recognition of the Efficient Capital Market Theory

The ECMT has not only heavily influenced economic theory
but also the legal and regulatory approaches towards prosecuting
and counteracting securities fraud by providing a structural
framework of how markets work.156 Generally, because of
information’s crucial role in properly valuing securities, the
ECMT has been used to preclude companies and traders from
engaging in or concealing certain activities and information.157
As insider trading is one of the restrictions supported by the
ECMT and presents the same issues common to other ECMTbased regulations, the extent of any punishment must reflect the
assumptions employed in these contexts.
1.

The SEC’s Efficient Disclosure System

Insider trading is, at its core, a crime based on access to
information. Since its prohibition is based on the perceived social
value of providing accurate and full information to the public,158
the rationale for rules governing disclosures generally should
correspond to the sentencing of acts that interfere with this
value. In its disclosure policies, the SEC has relied on the
efficiency of markets to disseminate information and translate it
into accurate valuations of publicly traded securities through a
complex disclosure system.159 In this sense, the SEC agreed “that
economists proved the efficient market hypothesis a decade ago

156
See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985).
157
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 552.
158
15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
159
See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2010) (annual report requirements); id.
§ 240.13a-13 (quarterly report requirements); id. § 240.15d-11 (current reports
requirements).
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and moved on to other topics entirely, so that all that is left is for
the law to come into conformity with this intellectual
orthodoxy.”160
The SEC regulates markets through disclosure rules focused
on compelling full and prompt information to individuals to
create a sense of a fair playing field for investors.161 The most
influential of these rules is Regulation FD, promulgated to
directly counteract insider trading on the basis of nonpublic or
selective disclosure.162 Regulation FD prohibits an issuer from
disclosing “material[,] nonpublic information” to an individual
without a near simultaneous disclosure of the event to the
public.163 It complements the prosecution of insider trading
under Rule 10b-5, as required disclosures under Regulation FD
are not premised on a “breach of a duty of trust or confidence,”164
but when it is “reasonably foreseeable that the . . . securities
[would be traded] on the basis of the information.”165 Therefore,
so long as an issuer refrains from disclosing the information to
anyone on the outside, no infraction has occurred.
The SEC has also realized that while the courts severely
punish insider trading under anti-fraud provisions, selective
disclosure can have just as severe and harmful an economic
impact as nondisclosure.166 The disclosure requirements in this
regard facilitate efficiency by reducing duplicative costs of
searching for information by market participants.167 The SEC
also requires disclosure of the trading activity by insiders168 and
has identified situations when insiders are never allowed to
trade, even if they are not in possession of inside information.169

160

Langevoort, supra note 21, at 539.
See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (“There cannot be honest markets
without honest publicity. Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place
thrive upon mystery and secrecy.”).
162
See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)–(b)(1).
163
Id. § 243.100(a).
164
Id. § 240.10b5-1(a).
165
Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv).
166
See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No.
7881, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No.
24,599, 73 SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000).
167
Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 150, at 738.
168
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring all officers, directors, and
“beneficial owner[s] of more than 10 percent of any” class of registered equity class
to file the appropriate notice with the SEC within ten days of acquiring a position).
169
See, e.g., id. § 78p(b) (short swing profits); id. § 78p(c) (short sales).
161
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Thus, market efficiency is achieved here by ensuring that the
market trades on the same information but without mandating
disclosure in all cases.
The ECMT’s view of information also explains the SEC’s
perception of the impact of disclosures, particularly in rules that
do not aim to provide all market participants with information,
but rather, to ensure that the right participants are informed.
The SEC’s use of integration, or incorporation by reference,
supports this view by permitting a publicly filed document
merely to refer to information previously disclosed in certain
cases instead of repeating the information.170 Such rules were
explicitly “created ‘in reliance on the efficient market theory,’ ”171
since the integrated information is regularly being evaluated by
analysts, yet available to the press and public for free.172 As an
efficient market will ensure that the disclosure “is adequately
reflected in the price of a [company’s] outstanding securities,” the
need for reiterating it has no discernible benefit.173 Certain
information may also be disseminated through alternative forms
to Exchange reports, such as press releases and conference calls,
provided that they “achieve the goal of effecting broad, nonexclusionary distribution of information to the public.”174
Overall, the SEC expects that once material information has
been accurately disseminated into the market in some capacity,
the market can be relied upon to process it into the security’s
price.
2.

Judicial Adoption of the ECMT

Courts have embraced the ECMT to explain how public
securities markets operate.
Initially, the assumptions
underlying the ECMT justified prohibiting insider trading, as
“the fundamental purpose of the [1934 Securities] Act [w]as
170

See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(3) (Form S-3).
Langevoort, supra note 118, at 876 (quoting Adoption of Integrated
Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18,
524, Investment Company Act Release No. 12,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 3,
1982)).
172
See Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6235, Investment Company Act
Release No. 11,327, 20 SEC Docket 1339 (Sept. 2, 1980).
173
Id.
174
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881,
Exchange Act. Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 73
SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000); see also Langevoort, supra note 118, at 877.
171
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implementing a philosophy of full disclosure.”175 Legislators
believed that the “free and open market” of information required
“the exercise of an enlightened judgment as to what constitutes a
fair price,” but “[i]nsofar as the judgment of either is warped by
false, inaccurate, or incomplete information regarding the
corporation, the market price fails to reflect the normal operation
of the law of supply and demand.”176 The ECMT’s influence on
punishing security fraud has since developed in three areas of
securities fraud case law: (1) determining what information the
public is entitled to know, or materiality;177 (2) presuming that
the nondisclosure of information impacts stock prices to prove
reliance;178 and (3) quantifying the value of the undisclosed
information based on the price movements following a corrective
disclosure to establish damages.179
By understanding that prices reflect information through
market reactions upon their public disclosure,180 fraudulent
nondisclosure is contingent on the materiality of the information
at issue. Material information is that which would be considered
by a reasonable investor in making an investment decision, in
that it creates “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor
as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”181 The “total mix” includes even uncertain events, and
therefore, the price of a security reflects disclosure of such
information as well.182 The recognition that uncertain events also
impact price—that is, the ECMT’s semi-strong view of markets—

175
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Sante Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176
S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 68 (1934).
177
See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
178
See, e.g., In re Bally Mfg. Sec. Corp. Litig., 141 F.R.D. 262, 269–70 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
179
See, e.g., In re Royal Dutch/Shell Transp. Sec. Litig., 404 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608
(D.N.J. 2005).
180
See, e.g., Bowe v. Polymedia Corp. (In re Polymedia Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1,
10 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A]n efficient market is one in which market price fully reflects
all publicly available information.”).
181
TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449.
182
See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Tex.
Gulf Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting that a stock’s price “will depend at
any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the
company activity”).
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was embraced in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,183 where
soft information, such as predictions, was material, since prices
are based on “beliefs about how firms will do tomorrow, not
because of how they did yesterday.”184 Even if the information is
false, it nonetheless aids the pricing of stocks because of
investors’ interest in seeking the truth.185
As explained by the ECMT’s market price signaling
mechanism, materiality determinations dictate whether
information is in fact nonpublic.186 Information becomes “public”
when “it has been internalized by ‘the market’—i.e., [when] the
security’s price reflects that information.”187
Once the
information is reflected in the price, it can no longer be misused,
because the insider is now on equal footing with the public.188
The public, therefore, may trade with an insider, even absent
personal knowledge of the previously undisclosed information, if
that information finds it way into the marketplace of ideas.189
Traders in possession of accurate information may serve to
accurately price a stock even in the face of contradictory
statements by the issuer.190 Once public, plaintiffs are in effect
charged with having constructive knowledge of it.191 Therefore,

183

892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 514 (discussing the process by which investors collectively evaluate
information in the context of the safe-harbor provisions for forward looking
statements under Rule 175(b)).
185
See id.
186
See Dennis, supra note 144, at 414–15.
187
RALPH C. FERRARA, DONNA M. NAGY & HERBERT THOMAS, FERRARA ON
INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL 2–9 (2010).
188
Id. (quoting United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993)).
189
See Dennis, supra note 144, at 419 (“Each market participant need not have
access to all information. Rather, the court should focus on whether enough traders
had the information so that the price signalling mechanism revealed the
information.”).
190
See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 14–18 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding
that where analysts disseminated their views of what the correct information
regarding a company was, false statements by the company were immaterial
because they were “either irrelevant or already publicly known”); Dennis, supra note
144, at 414 (“[T]he nearly simultaneous release of the information to several
securities analysts meant that, under the efficient market theory, any effect of the
disclosure on the market was rapidly assimilated . . . to the general public.”).
191
See Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530
(7th Cir. 1985) (“The investor cannot ask a court to focus on the lie and ignore the
remaining pieces of information already available to him (or, in the case of a publicly
traded security, already available to others and reflected in the price of the
security).”).
184
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liability for insider trading should be foreclosed once the
information is already public—that is, reflected in the price of the
stock.192
The conclusion that stock prices can be trusted to reflect all
public, material information coalesced in the fraud-on-themarket theory. Applicable in recovery of losses lawsuits under
Rule 10b-5, the theory permits a “person who traded a
corporation’s shares on a securities exchange after the issuance
of a materially misleading statement by the corporation [to]
invoke a rebuttable presumption [of reliance] on the integrity of
the price set by the market.”193 Reliance is presumed on a
showing: (1) of a material, public misrepresentation; (2) that the
“shares were traded in an efficient market”; and (3) that the
plaintiffs traded shares between the misrepresentation and the
corrective disclosure.194 The theory is supported by congressional
intent to “facilitate an investor’s reliance on the integrity of those
markets” by creating a “free and open public market” in which
the “price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.”195 Since “the
price of a company’s stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company,” misinformation
will presumptively affect the price at which others trade.196
When the misinformation was already incorporated into a price
though, the presumption may be rebutted, as a partially
informed market does not mislead investors.197
Finally, the ECMT has been employed to explain the impact
of a corrective disclosure for purposes of determining losses
caused by the defendant. Despite claiming not to adopt “any
particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly

192

See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166–67 (2d Cir. 1980).
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226, 243 (1988).
194
See Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2004). The
presumption is rebutted by showing that the plaintiff knew the truth or would have
traded even if the truth had been disclosed. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
906 (9th Cir. 1975).
195
Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (quoting from H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934)).
196
Id. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).
197
See Schneider v. Vennard (In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig.), 886 F.2d 1109,
1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that, although a company made various optimistic, but
misleading, statements that inflated the stock price, the negative, omitted
statements, were already priced into the stock due to analyst statements that
“effectively counter-balance any misleading impression”), overruled on other grounds
by Rubke v. Capitol Bancorp, 551 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2009).
193
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available information is reflected in market price,”198 in reality,
Basic adopted the semi-strong version of the ECMT.199 As
impersonal markets disseminate information, whether accurate
or misleading, “in the processed form of a market price,”200 the
information’s impact is used to calculate out-of-pocket losses.201
Out-of-pocket losses represent the difference between the
“price paid by the plaintiff” and the price the stock would have
been had the misrepresented or omitted information been public,
or the actual value.202 The actual value is based on either: (1) the
“constant ribbon” method, which presumes that the change in
value upon the curative disclosure reflects the amount the stock
was inflated or deflated by; or (2) the “constant true value”
method, which states “that the price following the curative
disclosure was the [actual] value” during the period of
nondisclosure.203 The “constant ribbon,” otherwise known as the
“market model,”204 in essence places a value on the omitted or
misrepresented information and works backward from the date
of disclosure, establishing a “value line.”205 The value line is
determined through either an “event study,” which focuses on the
market’s reaction to the corrective disclosure,206 or a comparable
198

Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 n.28.
See Macey & Miller, supra note 146, at 1077–80 (“Critical to the fraud-onthe-market theory is the assumption that the market can trade at ‘incorrect’ prices
due to the ‘artificial’ distortions caused by misstatements or omissions.”); see also
Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory To Measure Damages
in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 884–85 (1990).
200
Basic, 485 U.S. at 244.
201
See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 885.
202
See Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
rev’d on other grounds, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Cornell & Morgan, supra note
199, at 897.
203
See Jonathan C. Dickey & Marcia Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule 10b-5
Damages of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A Forward-Looking
Assessment, 51 BUS. LAW. 1203, 1204 (1996). To illustrate the difference, suppose a
trader purchases stock at $20, and the price then increases to $25, but then falls to
$15 upon the corrective disclosure: under the “ribbon” method, the loss would be $10
(price paid less the drop in stock price); under the “true value” method, the loss
would be $5 (price paid less the value of the stock with the corrective information).
See id.
204
See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 897.
205
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 646 (1985). At the date of corrective
disclosure, the value line and price line are equal, but the lines are divergent from
the period of the omission or misrepresentation until that time. See Cornell &
Morgan, supra note 199, at 886.
206
See United States v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866, 867 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
199
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index, “which approximates what the returns on the security
would have been had the fraud not occurred.”207
Neither
approach is lenient on defendants, so Congress placed a “cap” on
damages when basing out-of-pocket losses on the corrective date
of disclosure, fearing that it “may end up substantially
overestimating plaintiff’s damages.”208
While the different
approaches produce different results, these calculations all rely
on the assumption that the market will immediately incorporate
the disclosed information into a stock’s price. The foregoing
regulatory and judicial implementations of the ECMT
demonstrate the theory’s ability to address the ill-effects of
securities fraud and informational disadvantages while
establishing the parameters for liability in connection with
undisclosed information.
B.

The Prohibition of Insider Trading To Preserve Market
Efficiency

While the sentencing of insider trading must reflect the
ECMT-based principals embodied in other disclosure and
securities fraud regulations, it must also measure the impact of
illegal trading on the market’s efficiency. As recognized by
Nacchio, any assessment of appropriate sentencing must begin
with the nature of the offense that has been committed.209 The
offense of insider trading can be measured by its impediment on
an efficiently operating market, since its purpose is to promote
equal access to public information.210 As such, a return to the
desired market efficiency represents the conclusion of criminal
activity.
1.

Insider Trading’s Effect on Efficiency

Insider trading is criminalized based on the harm it inflicts
on securities markets, as opposed to civil actions, where specific
claims of monetary damages are sought.211 Generally, the stock
207

See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 897.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741
(referring to Rule 21D(e) of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2006))).
209
See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
210
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
211
See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1808–09 (1992).
208
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market is seen as a safer alternative to owning wealth, since
individual risk-aversion interferes with overall economic
efficiency
by
discouraging
otherwise
sound
economic
investments.212 In an efficient market, where information is
automatically disseminated and reflected in a price, individuals
can more efficiently gather and process information regarding
specific companies.213 Since the presence of insider trading at
any given time is by nature unknown, traders are unable to
accurately account for it in making their investment decisions,
increasing the risk of ownership. Public investors will then bear
the initial loss as a result of any specific insider trading,
although the ECMT holds that they are able to shift this cost,
with most eventually falling on the firms.214
According to the ECMT, the ideal mechanism to attain
efficient and liquid markets is through “a competitive
information traders’ market.”215 As opposed to insiders with
monopolistic access to information, informational traders cannot
manipulate disclosures as easily, yet can realize economies of
scale in discovering, “analyzing[,] and pricing general market
information.”216 When fraud such as insider trading is pervasive
though, these economic efficiencies cease, thereby increasing the
cost of gathering information and leading to a decreased number
of traders.217
Consequently, competition is reduced, and
remaining investors are left with higher “bid-ask spread[s].”218
Those who trade with insiders will inevitably lose out, a loss that
“cannot be diversified away, as all trades are triggered by either
a price change or the arrival of new information.”219 At the same
time, trades by insiders will have only a nominal impact on the
supply of the stock—an increase if the insider is selling, a
decrease if buying—as their trades are normally insufficient to
effect prices to reflect all information or signal to other investors
the nature of the undisclosed information.220

212
See Boyd K. Dyer, Economic Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets,
1992 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7–9.
213
See id. at 35.
214
See id. at 60–62.
215
Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 150, at 735–36.
216
See id. at 733–36.
217
See id. at 775.
218
See id.
219
See id. at 726.
220
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 630. But see infra notes 302–03.
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Nonetheless, if certain market conditions exist, notably, the
presence of adequate numbers of information traders, the market
will be able to reflect the impormation’s value upon
dissemination. This occurs for the same reasons that a market is
unable to price the stock when the information is undisclosed.
The ECMT posits that the later corrective disclosure should
allow for “an informed judgment [that] can be made by all
investors who trade in such markets”221 and consequently, the
resumption of the market’s functions of evaluating securities
evaluation and allocating capital.
2.

Insider Trading’s Effect on Market Participants

The most obvious victims of insider trading are those that
trade opposite of the insider. Not only do those investment
decisions lack all available information, but the trader either
purchased at an artificially high price—where the insider was
selling on negative information—or sold at an artificially low
price—where the insider was buying on positive information.
These effects, however, should not be overstated. An insider’s
nondisclosure fortuitously benefits those who traded with the
insider during this period. Further, an insider’s trades may
imply the direction of the stock were the information disclosed,
thereby improving the accuracy of the stock’s price.222
Insider trading also leads to a loss of confidence in the
markets. While the legislative history of Rule 10b-5 reflects that
investor confidence was an important policy protected by insider
trading laws because of its potential influence on market
integrity,223 it amounts to nothing more than a fairness issue.224
Insider trading liability is premised on “an affirmative duty to
disclose” information or abstain from trading225 that instills the
market with confidence that trades are made on an equal playing
221
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d
Cir. 1974).
222
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 205, at 645.
223
See 129 CONG. REC. 24,613 (1983) (statement of Rep. Wirth) (“Insider trading
threatens our capital markets by undermining the public’s expectations of fair and
honest securities markets where all participants play by the same rules.”).
224
See In re Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, 1 SEC Docket 21,
at 254 (May 25, 1973) (“Few practices, short of manipulation, have as deleterious an
effect on the investing public’s confidence in corporate institutions and the securities
markets as the selective disclosure of and misuse of so called inside information, i.e.,
material, non-public information.”).
225
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231 (1980).
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field.
While a sense of unfairness may persist beyond a
corrective disclosure, it is not of the nature punishable by law,
since the duty concludes upon disclosure, and “not every instance
of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under
§ 10(b).”226 Further, such abstract harms are too difficult to
measure to warrant extending the time-frame that a sentence is
based on.227
The company whose information is being used by the trader
to trade on has the strongest interest in preventing insider
trading.228 The information takes the form of property, which the
company has a vested right to use for whatever purposes it sees
fit.229 However, the “self-serving use of a principal’s information
to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
information.”230 In addition, insider trading directly increases
various costs to a company—of reducing risk;231 of using the
market through reduced economic efficiency;232 and management
agency costs borne by other market participants that lead to
discounted prices, resulting in higher costs of capital.233 It is the
increased cost of capital that is the most dramatic harm felt by
the company because traders, and not the company itself, are
able to profit from the information affecting the company.234
These costs cease to negatively impact a company upon
disclosure, however, as the cost of capital should reflect the

226

Id. at 232.
See Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 120, 121
(1980) (discounting such fairness arguments as “one of those qualities which exist in
the eye of the beholder and elicit little effort at explanation”).
228
See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 205. Take for instance a broker who
was known to be investigated for insider trading and actually received phone calls
from prospective investors inquiring into his services. See Richard L. Stern, The
Inside Inside Story, FORBES, Mar. 12, 1984, at 62.
229
See Scott, supra note 227, at 130.
230
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
231
Dyer, supra note 212, at 63.
232
Id. (“This cost causes economic inefficiency because some firms—those that
are sufficiently risk averse—will forego risky business opportunities.”).
233
Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 150, at 776.
234
See id.
227
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correct information immediately.235
Further, the threat of
increased costs of capital is only applicable in the case of
undisclosed positive information.236
C.

Applying the Efficient Capital Market Theory Approach to
Criminal Sentencing

In addition to assessing the social harms of insider trading, a
criminal sentence must reflect the trader’s culpability to ensure
consistency with the policies of criminal law and sentencing.237
By definition, one is no longer trading on the basis of undisclosed
information when the sale follows disclosure, but one is instead
trading on the basis of all information, which according to the
ECMT, is reflected in the price at which the sale occurred. Since
the trader completes the sale at the same price as the rest of the
market, only the trader’s gains as defined by the corrective
disclosure should be considered in sentencing.238
1.

Defining the Prohibited Offense

Sentences based on insider trading, as with any crime, must
reflect the nature of the offense.239 The elements of insider
trading are satisfied when an individual possesses and uses
nonpublic information in making the securities transaction, but
the illegal conduct stops when the deceptive action concludes.240
The focus on the use of undisclosed information is reinforced by
the ECMT: A market is efficient, both in terms of its pricing and
capital allocation functions, if a trader simply “knows” of insider
information but refrains from dealing in the security. As such,
the criminal components of insider trading further demarcate the
boundaries of liability for sentencing purposes.
235

See id. at 777.
Unlike the non-disclosure of positive information, which precludes the
company from borrowing money at a more favorable rate, the non-disclosure of
negative information artificially reduces the cost of capital and therefore, benefits
the company. See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1076 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
237
See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077.
238
It should be noted that that the trader’s sale after disclosure is the concern
for trading on positive information. As exhibited in Nacchio, when trading on
negative information, the trader likely sold well before the corrective disclosure. 573
F.3d at 1076. In both cases, the date of disclosure is crucial.
239
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (West 2011).
240
United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1106 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(Bright, J., dissenting).
236
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From a criminal law perspective, the initial trade based on
undisclosed information satisfies the actus reas requirement.241
This act must coincide with the attendant circumstances242—the
trade occurring while the information remains undisclosed.243
The action and circumstances are linked temporally by the
element of causation, as the statute requires the transaction to
occur “in connection with” a sale or purchase.244 As such, trading
absent the knowledge of the undisclosed information is not
criminal.245 Yet this concept has not been consistently applied, as
the Mooney Court penalized the trader’s “gain[s]” as those
obtained “through trading” generally—in essence, the gross profit
the defendant obtained when all was said and done.246 But under
Mooney’s approach, a trader that purchased shares at a price
below the sales price earned no “gains,” regardless of whether
further losses were avoided by selling. By basing a sentence on
net profits, and not profits caused by the illegal act, this
approach blatantly disregards the element of causation.247
The necessity of a trader’s use of information also sheds light
on when the offense has concluded. If a trader—aware of the
information and already owning shares previously obtained
legally—merely holds onto his shares based on the inside
information and sells following disclosure, the trader has not
committed a crime under Rule 10b-5.248 As the use of inside
information forms the basis of the insider’s duty to “disclose or
abstain” from trading,249 there is no duty to abstain from trading
241
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 127 (5th
ed. 2009) (“The ‘actus reus’ is the physical or external part of the crime . . . .”).
242
Id. at 147 (“An attendant circumstance is a condition that must be present, in
conjunction with the prohibited conduct or result, in order to constitute the crime.”).
243
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c) (2010).
244
See id.
245
See SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2004).
246
See United States v. Mooney, 425 F.3d 1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2010)).
247
See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009). To illustrate the flaws in assessing culpability of trading on
negative information, take two traders with options exercisable at $10: A exercises
and sells while the stock is selling at $35, making a profit of $25; B waits, and
exercises and sells at $10, making no profit. When the negative information is then
disclosed, the price of the stock falls to $5. While B avoided $5 of losses through the
insider knowledge, under the net profit approach, only A would be punished, because
B did not earn a “gain.” See id. at 1084.
248
See id. at 1072.
249
See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1998) (“It is the
insider’s use, not his possession, that gives rise to an informational advantage and
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immediately upon disclosure.250 The sentence imposed must be
tied to the “real [criminal] conduct,” and therefore, it must
disregard profits obtained legally,251 which is when the duty to
abstain has ended: upon a corrective disclosure.
Since insider trading sentencing is based on the “gain
resulting from the offense,”252 and the offense concludes upon
dissemination, any consideration of post-dissemination gains is
excessive and unwarranted. While Mooney was right in noting
that the Guidelines reject victims’ losses as a metric of
culpability,253 it failed to realize that it is equally important to
impose a sentence that ignores subsequent gyrations of the
market following dissemination.254 The court in Nacchio properly
understood that “the court’s focus should be on ensuring that the
gain figure resulting from the offense excludes to the extent
possible . . . factors unrelated to the defendant’s criminally
culpable conduct.”255 By suggesting that the cut-off date may
extend to a reasonable time after disclosure,256 Nacchio’s
approach does not go far enough in this regard, since moving the
measurement date forward in time ensures that fewer outside
factors are priced into a stock’s value for calculation purposes.257
The criminal law focuses on punishing the defendant.258 The
ECMT works within the context of criminal liability to determine
whether an insider’s gains will ultimately be incorporated into a
punishment. The proscribed punishment is a contribution of
retributive—focusing on the perceived severity of the conduct

the requisite intent to defraud.”); SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding “that mere knowing possession—i.e., proof that an insider traded
while in possession of material nonpublic information—is not a per se violation” of
Rule 10b-5).
250
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997) (“[F]ull disclosure
forecloses liability . . . .”).
251
See Alexandra A.E. Shapiro & Nathan H. Seltzer, Measuring “Gain” Under
the Insider Trading Sentencing Guideline Based on Culpability for the Deception, 20
FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 197 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253 (2005)).
252
Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1067.
253
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.4 cmt. background (2010).
254
See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1077.
255
Id. at 1080.
256
See id.
257
See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005).
258
See Mann, supra note 211, at 1808.
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and the resulting harm259—and utilitarian elements. A primary
utilitarian element is deterrence, which must be imposed at the
most efficient levels, since imprisonment produces a social cost
not found in the payment of damages.260 The Nacchio Court
supported the disgorgement approach in part because of its
ability to deter improper conduct261—yet its approach fails to
adequately achieve this goal.
The consequences of criminal securities regulation have
ineffectively deterred fraudulent conduct.
Because of the
complex set of outside factors that uniquely affect corporate
crime and the infrequency of detection, criminal securities
regulation must strive to punish the immoral conduct at issue.262
While perhaps not the basis for conviction, retributive
principles—or the degree of blame an act deserves—therefore,
limit the extent of the sentence.263 As insider trading is triggered
by an initial purchase using inside information, culpability is
inextricably tied to the effects of that inside information and not
just trading generally. Therefore, the moral blame of insider
trading is contingent on and limited to gains from the
undisclosed information.
2.

Federal Sentencing Guidelines

The Guidelines mandate that sentences reflect the severity
of the crime but must not be greater than necessary to comply
with the Guidelines’ stated policies.264 A sentence based on the
difference between the purchase and market price upon
disclosure is justified because it: (1) establishes clear standards
of punishment; (2) avoids sentencing disparities; and (3) deters
future criminal conduct.
First, punishing only according to the corrective disclosure
ensures that a definite period of imprisonment is produced, a
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See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly
of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 54 (2009).
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See id. at 47–48.
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See Nacchio, 573 F.3d at 1079.
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See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal
Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 973–74 (2003).
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See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 44–45 (1997).
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See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2011).
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goal of particular importance in white-collar crime.265 Clear
standards are achieved by avoiding extensive fact finding, which
is especially appropriate given the practical considerations at
sentencing.266 The event study methodology proposed by the
defendant in Nacchio, although premised on the ECMT,267 fails to
address these concerns. The court in Nacchio remanded for a
determination of when the information had been fully digested by
the market, “[s]o long as the end date chosen results in a
‘reasonable approximation’ of illegal profits.”268 According to the
defendant’s event study, the effect of the disclosures on the
stock’s price formed the basis of the portion of the proceeds
attributable to the inside information.269 A determination as to
when information has been sufficiently “corrected,” however, will
likely be resolved in the trial court’s finding of guilt270 and
therefore, provides a clear result. The potential benefits of event
studies are also limited. The impact of institutional traders and
the increased reliance on electronic dissemination of
information271 makes it unlikely that more than one day’s worth
of trading in a liquid market is needed to “absorb” a piece of
information.272
Second, and most importantly, this approach “avoid[s]
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated

265
See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 22 (1988).
266
See United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting the “time
and evidentiary constraints on the sentencing process”); United States v. Bahkit,
218 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Most defendants do not have the
resources to hire an independent expert and the government has similar financial
constraints.”).
267
See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 886.
268
See United States v. Nacchio, 573 F.3d 1062, 1080 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 54 (2009).
269
See id. at 1068.
270
See, e.g., id. at 1066 (finding the defendant’s guilt was based on evidence
indicating that the full extent of the information traded on was nonpublic until a
later, specific disclosure).
271
See Use of Electronic Media, Securities Act Release No. 7856, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,728, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,426, 65 Fed. Reg.
25,843, at 25,844 (May 4, 2000) (“The increased availability of information through
the Internet has helped to promote transparency, liquidity and efficiency in our
capital markets.”).
272
See, e.g., Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 890 n.23 (“The efficient
market hypothesis implies that the market price should reflect the information in
the announcement no later than the close of trading on . . . the day that the Wall
Street Journal published an article about the press release.”).
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defendants.”273 The Supreme Court in Booker reiterated the need
for uniformity of sentences, not only “for those convicted of
violations of the same statute,” but, “more importantly, of similar
relationships between sentences and real conduct.”274 As the
dissent in Mooney illustrated with the “Moe, Larry, and Curly”
hypothetical, by only using market prices that reflect a security’s
information at the time of sale, the conduct is divorced from the
sentence and results in disparate sentences.275 Sentencing
disparities even arise between traders who profited the same
during the undisclosed period and whose stocks increased equally
following disclosure.276
The Guidelines do not distinguish
between gains through small volume trading on extraordinarily
significant information that drastically alters the price of the
security from gains obtained through high volume trading on
minor pieces of information. By accounting for profits unrelated
to the curative disclosure, defendants trading on less significant
information but a larger number of shares will be punished more
than those with smaller holdings who trade on more valuable
information.
A third policy of the Guidelines is to impose sentences that
“afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”277 It could be
argued that applying the ECMT approach to calculate gains
would invite insider trading because it may result in lower
sentences. But, lower sentences would only result if the stock
price continued in the direction it moved upon disclosure. If the
stock price “bounces back” following the initial reaction to the
curative disclosure—a typical event upon the release of
significant information—the ECMT approach actually results in
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United States v. Jackson, 959 F.2d 81, 83 (8th Cir. 1992).
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 (2005).
275
See supra note 90.
276
For example, two traders illicitly earn the same gains at the date of
disclosure. Trader A bought 100 shares of Company X at $9 each, and on disclosure,
the price increased to $10. Trader B bought 50 shares of Company Y at $8 each, and
on disclosure, the price increased to $10. Using the date of disclosure as the end
date, both gained $100 from insider trading and thus would be sentenced equally. If
both retain their holdings, and over the subsequent year, shares of X and Y increase
in value equally, say by $1, then under the Mooney net profit method, Trader A will
be sentenced longer because he realized $50 more in gains than B.
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18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (West 2011). Deterrence is also a stated policy of
the SEC in criminalizing insider trading. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 25TH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION 4 (1959), available at
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a higher sentence.278 Further, effective deterrence requires not
just the threat of punishment but a sense of justice because the
community must consider the punishment.279 This could explain
why, despite increased prosecution of insider trading, virtually
no deterrence effect has been observed.280 As one commentator
has noted, “[h]arsher sentences may sell well in elections, but
they appear unlikely to have large deterrence benefits.”281
Punishing for changes in a stock’s value unrelated to the
disclosure could further erode any stigma associated with the
offense, whereas “a short but definite period of confinement
might deter future crime more effectively.”282
D. Application of the ECMT Approach to Gain Calculations
This Note proposes calculating gains as the difference
between the initial transaction—made on the basis of material,
nonpublic information—and its price concurrent with the
corrective disclosure.283 At this point, since the ECMT states that
the price of the stock will immediately reflect the previously
undisclosed information, any appreciation in price subsequent to
the initial purchase represents the illicit gains and consequently,
278
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 42 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741.
279
See Lynch, supra note 263, at 47–48 (comparing the moral implications of
technical and routine trivial white-collar crimes with the stigma associated with
violating the rules of Prohibition, which ultimately led to a lack of respect of the
criminal law in general).
280
Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading
Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 332–33 (1998) (contending
that corporate insiders’ continuing ability to make insider trading profits reflects the
lack of deterrence in the current regulatory scheme because the SEC does not have
the resources to investigate and follow up on tips, and it is difficult to prove a
violation through proof of the piece of information the insider traded on).
281
Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 688
(2002).
282
See Breyer, supra note 265.
283
This calculation is based on a trader’s gains from positive information. When
a trader sells on the basis of negative information, the difference between the closing
prices immediately preceding disclosure and immediately following disclosure is to
be used. The difference between the two scenarios is that the “buy low” trader’s
gains involve the purchase price, while the “sell high” trader’s gains do not. The
primary reason for this distinction is that a “sell high” trader may not have
purchased the shares illegally and thus only the later illegal sale is relevant. In this
situation, this Note proposes that an approach comparable to the “constant ribbon”
method be used, in that the market’s reaction to the information represents the
trader’s gain or losses avoided. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text.
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dictates the sentence. Such an approach reflects the nature of
the prohibited conduct and resulting harms in its economic
context.
The suggested use of the ECMT to determine the proper
measure of gains in insider trading sentencing may not be
appropriate in all cases, as it requires a sufficiently efficient
market to begin with and may be overcome with proof to the
contrary. First, the security must be traded on a national market
exchange, with adequate volume.284
Second, the corrective
information must be adequately disclosed, although this may be
presumptively established if the stock price has been affected
and some public disclosure has taken place.285 Such a disclosure
need only be “in a manner calculated to reach the securities
market place in general through recognized channels of
distribution, and public investors must be afforded a reasonable
waiting period to react to the information.”286 This “reasonable
waiting period”287 is incorporated by looking at the stock price at
the next closing price, which reflects both the ECMT as well as
the practical reality of when information, especially of the
corrective nature, is disclosed.288
The rationale for the presumption of a corrective disclosure
is that the conviction has already established the materiality of
the information, in that it was initially traded on because it
would affect the stock price. Further, strong form efficiency
indicates that the information has partly been absorbed even
prior to that disclosure.
Volume and price movements
themselves send a message to analysts regarding the nature of
insider information, especially if some analysts can deduce the
identity of insider traders.289 Therefore, if sufficiently traded and
adequately disclosed, according to the ECMT, the price at the
next closing bell represents the value of the stock with that

284
See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on
the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 912 (1989) (noting the preconditions for
use of the fraud on the market theory).
285
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968).
286
In re Faberge, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 10,174, 1 SEC Docket 21, at 6
(May 25, 1973).
287
Id.
288
See supra notes 271–72 and accompanying text.
289
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 572–79. One study shows that a
simple strategy of trading upon 16(a) filings earns excess returns of three to five
percent. See Fried, supra note 280, at 325 n.87.
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information.290 Since the trader profited by the value of stock
with the inside information, the gain has been established,
regardless of a subsequent sale.
The analysis used by courts to determine the adequacy of the
corrective disclosure should remain consistent with those
principals implicating liability in the first place. Therefore, a
“complete” corrective disclosure is not required to assess an
insider’s gain, as the ECMT indicates that even uncertainty will
be factored into a stock’s price.291 Market reactions in the
direction implied by the information may indicate whether an
adequate corrective disclosure has occurred.292 In the case of a
clear corrective disclosure directly contradicting or revealing
what was originally nonpublic, the determination is simple: the
date of disclosure. When there is only a partially corrective
disclosure, a court should consider if the disclosure satisfies the
“public information” test.293 If so, then the information has been
reflected in the price, and gains may be measured. This
approach avoids the pitfalls of trying to precisely match the
information traded on with what is later disclosed, otherwise
known
as
establishing
an
“equivalent
disclosure.”294
Additionally, it recognizes that liability attaches to the
information and not the total effect of an insider’s trades, as the
materiality of each disclosure is viewed independently.295
The strict ECMT approach also best furthers the goals of
causation mandated by Dura Pharmaceuticals and criminal
sentencing by punishing only those gains caused by the deceptive
trading.296 Unlike in Mooney, the measure of gains, in the
290
See Dennis, supra note 144, at 419 (“The courts should limit their inquiry to
whether a particular item of information has, or would have, affected the price of a
stock.”).
291
See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting
that a stock price reflects “a balancing of both the indicated probability that the
event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of
the company activity”).
292
See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54–55 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc).
293
See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text.
294
See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 199, at 894–97 (discussing the problems
that arise when, as noted in Basic, the fraud consisted of the non-disclosure of
merger discussions, but the corrective disclosure was the merger completion).
295
See United States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1157 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If an
insider trades on the basis of his perception of the net effect of two bits of material
undisclosed information, he has violated the law in two respects, not none.”), vacated
in part en banc, 55 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009).
296
Dura Pharms. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
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context of either positive or negative information, is based on the
benefit derived from illegally trading and not gross profits.297
Therefore, even if a trader ended up losing money on the
transaction, if the information the trader sold on allowed him to
sell at a higher price than otherwise, the loss avoided is
dispositive. Under Nacchio, the stock price for calculating gains
is “when the information is disclosed and absorbed by the
market.”298 The proposed ECMT method, on the other hand, uses
the stock price only upon disclosure.
While the flexible
“reasonable time” standard in Nacchio is meant to reflect “that
the price of thinly traded stocks will not adjust as quickly or as
accurately as the price of stocks such as IBM,” it also
“lack[s] . . . [any] reference to an adjustment for the movement of
the market in the interim”299 period between when disclosed and
absorbed.
Further, the common methods for determining when
information has been absorbed have inherent flaws that
outweigh any potential benefits they may provide. Comparable
indexes will automatically attribute any change in price not
otherwise reflected in the relevant index to the fraud, and
therefore, if there is other company-specific information of the
same nature—positive or negative—gains will be overstated.300
Under the ECMT approach, this other information will be
excluded to the greatest extent possible by holding that only the
market reaction upon disclosure constitutes avoided losses.
Statistical models commonly employed to quantify the “impact”
of information on stock prices, such as event studies, may
partially address this problem but fail to account for leakages of
information. For example, if investors traded solely based on
watching the trading activity of known insiders, the impact of the
corrective disclosure will be mitigated.301 Such studies, when
used by defendants who are obvious insiders, such as Nacchio,
will conclude that the market only slightly reacted to the
corrective disclosure, and thus, the impact of that information
was minimal, when in fact, the price had already partially
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reflected the information contained in the disclosure.302 If only
market reactions form the basis of gains, sentences will then be
understated. But under the ECMT approach, by factoring in all
gains derived from positive information subsequent to the initial
illegal purchase, these leakages are reflected in the sentence so
that the total benefit derived from the information is applied to
the sentence.
CONCLUSION
Applying the ECMT to the calculation of insider trading
gains for criminal sentencing purposes results in the most
equitable punishment for the nature of the offense committed. In
doing so, it recognizes the arguments regarding the culpability
and duration of the offense of trading on inside information
raised in Nacchio but also the practicalities of the sentencing
process and the need for a clear and coherent punishment
advocated by Mooney.
“In the aftermath of the financial crisis,” it is not surprising
to see “a re-direction of criminal enforcement attention toward
Wall Street using aggressive methods.”303 Nevertheless, it is
incumbent on courts to focus on the harms and conduct of insider
trading when sentencing those found guilty. As the offense
revolves around the possession and use of nonpublic information,
the ECMT supplies a universally recognized explanation of when
a stock price can be expected to incorporate that piece of
information.
While the criminalization of insider trading
remains a vital tool in protecting the operation of and confidence
in publicly traded securities markets, the extent of the harms
caused and profits gained through the prohibited act must be
kept in perspective. Even on the basis of inside information,
trading in public markets still involves risk and is always subject
to unforeseen developments and events.
One of those
uncertainties, however, should not be whether a stock’s change in
price, which is unrelated to the information that formed the basis
of an illegal trade, can affect the time one spends in prison.
302
See id. at 905 n.50. One study found that stock prices of target companies
were thirty percent higher prior to the initial announcement of the transaction than
what the market model would have predicted. See Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B.
Poulsen, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider Trading
or Market Anticipation?, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 237 (1989).
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Hamilton & Zimmerman, supra note 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).

